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Since the end of 1950s, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have become the most important
legal instrument in the orb of international investment law. These treaties oJfer the highest legal
protection to investors'property rights. They do so by listing out standards, e.g., substantive rights
of investment treatment, in foreign countries. While they are also used as a source of law in the
process of Investor-State dispute settlement process, it has always been observed that the interna-
tional human rights obligation of investment receiving states ("host-states') gets no or little atten-
tion in this process. This is the direct reverberation of the asymmetrical nature of the BITs
provisions and the negligence of arbitral tribunals, which fail to generate the human rights aspect
of the business.
Owing to the astasia and unbalanced discourse between international investment laws and inter-
national human rights rules, the host-states have wrongly been interpreted by the arbitral tribunals
to have used their regulatory power in breach of the BITs provisions even in legitimate cases where
the states have a police power to protect the public health, the environment, and other implications
of rights like labor standards. Pro-investors avowal is that BITs, as source of international invest-
ment law, should be conceived of as a "sel/-contained regime" of international law, and hence,
stands separately out of the influence of international human rights law whatsoever. Human
rights lawyers, on the other side, endorse a broader notion of regulatory power of host-state to allow
them to insert the deftnse of human rights in the investment dispute settlement process. This essay
is a review of how these two interests can be accommodated for a prolific integration and tenable
cross-fertilization between both norms of international human rights and foreign investment
protection.
* Henok G. Gabisa is a Visiting International Law Fellow at Washington and Lee University School of
Law in Lexington, Virginia. He can be reached at GabisaH@wlh.edu. The author is grateful to Mr. Benjamin
Stephens, Managing Editor of The Iernational Lawyer, at SMU Dedman School of Law for comments that
improved this essay. The author would also like to thank Ms. Kebene K. Wodajo for her comment on the
piece. I remain solely responsible for those errors that remain.
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I. Introduction
The last half-century witnessed two major competing, at times pragmatically conflict-
ing, regimes of international law that will continue to substantively define the general
practices and behavior of states in the discourse of international law and policy. The first
Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT"), signed over 50 years ago, in 1959, between Germany
and Pakistan' marked the transformation of transnational investment protection by be-
coming an essential instrument and source of international investment law in the existing
world economic order. BIT, as a major legal instrument in the flow of Foreign Direct
Investment ("FDI"), is an international legal document that guarantees the protection of
the investors and their investments in a foreign country from the risks of a non-commer-
cial nature such as nationalization and other regulatory measures interfering with the in-
vestors' legitimate expectations.
2
Highly ascribed to a potentially suspicious domestic law of investment-receiving coun-
try (the "host state") in offering appropriate legal protection to the properties of the for-
eign investor, and because the customary international law standards on the protection of
foreign investment 3 were frequently marred by persistent disagreement between the
global north and south, international treaties emerged as the principal source of norms in
the foreign investment milieu. 4 This newly designed concept of BIT unarguably leaves
the protection of investors in a foreign country with little or no concern for the interna-
tional principles and norms applicable to the protection of human rights and freedom of
citizens of the host state. Undoubtedly, the private interest of the investor is the dominat-
1. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva, Sept. 17, 2009,
World Investmen Report: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, 32; Luke Eric
Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties, Rights & Democracy, 12 (2009), available at http://
publications.gc.ca/collections/collection 2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009-eng.pdf.
2. RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3-
7 (2008).
3. The relevant customary international law that was specifically applicable to the international protection
of investment, in addition to the theory of the minimum standard of treating aliens and foreign property, was
best understood with respect to the practice of "Hull Formula." See VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
197-99 (Clarendon Law Series 1st ed. 2007). This formula was based on the principle that the standard of
compensation is characterized as "adequate, effective, and prompt compensation." Developed in 1938 during
the tension between the United States and the government of Mexico caused by the national plan of Mexico
to nationalize all the foreign properties, this standard of compensation was named after the Secretary of State
who was the author of note about the standard towards the government of Mexico. See IAN BROWNLIE, THE
RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 140-3 (1998). The United State Note was in response to Mexican nationalization pro-
grams in the 1930s. The Mexican Government did not reject the principle of compensation but maintained
that the measure of compensation must depend upon the capacity to pay of the nationalizing state, because
otherwise an obligation to pay "immediately the value of the property taken" would deny the State the right
to restructure its economy and to introduce economic reforms. Based on this, the practice had been accepted
as a customary rule of international law regarding expropriation of foreign investment. However, because of
the formula's high championship by the Westerns, the newly emerging states of Africa after decolonization
process came to, later on, contest the practice of this rule. Immediately after the mounting disagreement
between the developed and newly emerging countries, BITs therefore became a major instrument and re-
placed the same exact standard of customary practice, but in a treaty form, to continue to regulate the regime
of international investment protection.
4. Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3,
16 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 1st ed. 2008).
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ing value in crafting the content of bilateral treaties and its respective procedural
guarantees.5
The central principles embodied by BITs only take account of investment protection
and encouragement. Despite the fact that the exact contents differ from one treaty to the
other, all BITs nowadays address two main interests exclusive to foreign investors: sub-
stantive rights with reference to the treatment of foreign investment and dispute settle-
ment procedures. 6 Remarkably, not only do foreign investors usually have no enforceable
obligations listed under BITs, but most investment treaties are silent as to the rights of
non-investors, for the most part, when it comes to the local citizens.7
In the other compartment of public international law is the regime of international
human rights law with well- established jurisprudence and discourse that was developed
subsequent to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948
("UDHR") after World War II. International human rights commitments require states
not only to simply refrain from interfering with the rights of citizens, but on occasions,
requires that states regulate the activities of non-state actors, including business actors, in
a fashion that ensures that citizens enjoy their rights enshrined under all international
human rights conventions. However, in instances when the host state has entered into
international commitments with foreign investors through bilateral investment treaties,
this will open up the possible episode for foreign investors to challenge their treatment at
the hands of the host state despite the host state's motive to advert to its human rights
obligations to protect, respect and, fulfill-springing from UN treaty rights. Following
these contradicting phenomena, in different words, the fundamental problem reveals itself
when the monothematic commercial interest embedded in the international investment
instrument collides with the host state's subsequent activity in taking steps to implement
human rights obligation it owes to its citizens based on other international human rights
conventions and protocols.
International arbitration tribunals tasked with assessing the compliance of states with
their obligations to foreign investors are occasionally confronted with human rights ques-
tions, including the relevance of human rights law to the resolution of disputes between
foreign investors and states. It is, therefore, not surprising that investment arbitral tribu-
nals regularly deplore the lack of appropriate middle and reconciling grounds and stan-
dards of protecting foreign investment and simultaneously making sure international
human rights obligations of the host state remain intact.8
The existing framework of international investment law and investor-state arbitration,
in practical discourse, assumes a readiness to rebuff and reject the opportunity to confer
on the host states the standing privilege to bring the argument of international human
5. D.F. VAGTS, W.S. DODGE, AND H.H. KOH, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 455 (2003).
6. See Howard Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Oppor-
tunities, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 4 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia business
hmman-rights.pdf.
7. See Luke Eric Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties, RGHTS & DEMOCRACY, 12, 15
(2009), availahle at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection 2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009-eng.pdf.
8. See generally The Working Group on General Public International Law and International Investment
Law, General Public International Law and International Investment Law: A Research Sketch on Selected Issues,
Beitrige zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht Heft 205, (2011), availahle at http://telc.jura.ri-halle.de/
sites/default/files/BeitraegeTVR/Heft%20105.pdf (discussing human rights and investment arbitration)
[hereinafter Working Group Report on International Investment Law].
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rights obligations. 9 In conjunction with this, a separate constitution of international in-
vestment arbitration for every dispute settlement is also considered one of the factors that
pose constant threats of inconsistencies of decisions and fragmentation.10 As a result of
this, it appears over time that the discourse is failing to reconcile human rights values with
the protection of foreign investors.1
Many other authors broadly identify this problem as a clash between investment treaty
arbitration and general law approach, which means, contemplating the discourse of invest-
ment treaties as a "self-contained regime" of international law, more separate and exclusive
from the general public international law norms.1 2 This is one of the crucial elements in
understanding the practically contradicting discourse between international investment
protection and international human rights enforcement mechanisms.
This essay seeks to address the conceptual inter-face between BITs and international
human rights obligation of the host states. It dwells on whether the host state can raise
international human rights obligation it owes under human rights treaties (e.g.: The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, Convention Against Torture,, and so forth) as a legal defense in the
process of investor-state dispute settlement process.
The author believes that the world order of human dignity and "global good' of rule of
law requires that one regime of international law cannot be understood in isolation, dis-
tinct and unconnected from the other. Therefore, arbitral venues shall allow both the
commercial interest and human rights interest to prevail in solving investment disputes
between a foreign investor and host state. In order to appropriately address the discus-
sion, the essay first seeks to present a brief overview of BITs along with the typical stan-
dards of investment protection. The essay also tries to gauge and scrutinize whether the
conservative understanding of investment protection as "a self-containing regime" holds
water in the discourse. The essay also investigates the lateral, i.e., the leftist proposition of
and heavy reliance on customary practice of "police power" of host states in the quandary at
hand. The essay will also make some reconnaissance as to the current practice of investor-
state investment dispute settlement and reflect on remarkable cases that present the pre-
dicament of human rights. Finally, the author gives the alternative and plausible policy
solutions in settling the practical conflict between the legal regime of foreign investment
protection and human international rights discourse.
9. See id.
10. It is important to note from the rule of investment dispute arbitration that parties to the dispute must
agree as to who will be the arbitrators. In most cases, a panel consists of three arbitrators. G.A. Rus. 65/22, at
6-8, A/RES/65/22 (Apr. 2011).
11. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 280-85
(2009).
12. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, at 400, 401, 405,
410-12, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No 10 (2006) (emphasis added).
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II. Evolution, Definition, and Major Contents of BITs
After the first half of 20th century, BITs have become the most important legal instru
ments effecting private foreign investment activities. 13 BITs, according to Cornell Uni-
versity Legal Information Institute, "are international agreements creating the terms and
conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one state in another
state."'14 The first generation of these treaties were Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion Treaties ("FCN"s), which put obligations on the investment receiving country, i.e.,
host state, to treat foreign investments on the same level as investments from any other
state, including in some occasions treatment that was as favorable as the host nation
treated its own national investors."5 FCNs also established the terms of trade and ship-
ping between the parties, and the rights of foreigners to conduct business and own prop-
erty in the host state.
16
The second generation of these treaties are BITs, 17 which set forth actionable standards
of conduct that applied to governments in their treatment of investors from other states,
including fair and equitable treatment (also referred to as national treatment, which pro-
vides that a host state shall treat foreign and domestic enterprises equally), protection
from expropriation; free transfer of means and fill protection and security.' 8
A BIT is an agreement between two states that protect and promote investments from
one state to another state. 19 A BIT is a treaty between two States that ensures that inves-
tors of a State-Party receive certain standards of treatment when investing in the territory
13. See Bilateral investment treaties, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/bi
lateral investment-treaty (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); see also RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-3 (1995).
14. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (Cambridge University Press 5th ed. 2003).
15. See Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and
Practice, 70 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 99, 113 (1999).
16. Todd Grierson-Weiler & Ian A. Laird, Standards of Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTER
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 259, 275-85 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 1st ed. 2008).
17. The creation of BIT is believed by majority to replace the international protection of foreign invest-
ment activines that had been relied on by customary international law of the "Hull Formula", the formula
that required adequate, prompt, and effective compensation in case of expropriation. See M. H. Mendelson,
Compensation for Expropriation: The Case Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1985). The state of this customary law
had been at issue between developed and developing countries particularly in Africa during the time of
decolonization. By rejecting this formula, therefore, newly emerging countries claimed they could national-
ize all the colonizing power's assets and their national's commercial enterprises according to their nation's
laws, in their nation's courts, without necessarily paying compensation. International law standards of com-
pensation and protection of foreign investment were thus becoming quite unclear, and as a result, it forced
major investment source countries like Germany to engage in bilateral investment protection treaties with
developing countries. It is much more like a reinventing of the customary rule except that this time the
standards of investment protections are affirmatively sealed in a legal instrument; which means, BIT as an
international legal instrument clearly reinstated the essence of the Hull formula in a detail and precise way.
See generally Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on Invest-
ment at the U7O: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between, Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 95 (2005) (discussing the
evolution of the Hull Formula in modern BITs and the history of African nations and BITs).
18. See GEORG SSCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (1969); see
also CAMPBELL McLACHLAN QC ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTVE
PRINCIPLES 202 (2007).
19. LUKE Emc PETERSON, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: MADLY
OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS 3 (2005), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50084.pdf.
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of the other State-Party.2 0 The purpose is to encourage FD121 between the two State-
Parties, which hopefilly leads to economic growth for both State-Parties. 2 2 However,
BITs grant foreign investors rights against sovereign States, and allow them to directly
initiate arbitration against a State when the State has not filfilled its obligations under a
BIT.23 Investors have claimed millions of dollars in damages under BITs for State regula-
tions, for example, addressing an emergency financial crisis, refusing to grant a license for
a toxic waste facility, and enacting affirmative action legislation.
24
Most BITs have a dispute resolution clause that constitutes "a unilateral offer to settle
disputes by arbitration, extended to the investor by the state, and which the investor ac-
cepts by initiating arbitration under the treaty. 2 5 Where a host-state has a BIT with a
foreign investor's home state and the host state breaches its obligations to the investor as
enumerated in the BIT, the investor may bypass domestic court systems and bring a claim
directly against the Host-State before an international arbitration tribunal.2 6 Thus, the
arbitration is not between the two States that entered into the BIT, but rather, BITs allow
the investor to directly sue nation-states for violating their treaty obligations to the corpo-
rate investor, i.e., private individual. Notably, to date, investors have initiated the vast
majority of cases. 27
The distinctive feature of many BITs is that they allow for a dispute resolution mecha-
nism whereby an investor whose rights have been violated under the BIT could have re-
course to International arbitration, often under the auspices of the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").28 ICSID is the leading interna-
tional arbitration institution devoted to Investor-State dispute settlement.29 ICSID is an
autonomous international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID or the
Washington Convention, entered into force in 1966) with over one hundred and forty
member States.30 The Convention sets forth ICSID's mandate, organization and core
finctions. The primary purpose of ICSID is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbi-
tration of international investment disputes. ICSID was created by the Convention as an
20. Jose E. Alvarez, Empire, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An "Empire Of Law" Or The "Law Of
Empire"?, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 943-59 (2009).
21. According to UNCTAD, "global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows increased by an estimated
110% in 2013 to around USD 1.46 trillion," ELEVENTH REPORT ON G20 INVESTMENT MEASURES 1 (2014);
see also UNCTAD, Global Investment Trends Monitor, Jan. 28, 2014; OECD, FDI IN FIGURES (2014); and
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics-OECD Data, Analysis and Forecasts, http://www.oecd.org/invest
ment/statistics.htm.
22. See generally Avarez, supra note 20.
23. See generally id.
24. MARY HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER, Do BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES ATTRACT FDI? ONLY A BIT
... AND THEY COULD BITE 22-23 (2003), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-
9450-3121.
25. Naomi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation in the
Legitimacy Debate, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 271, 281 (2009).
26. See id. at 278-79.
27. Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Transnational Corporate Responsihility for the 21st Centruy: Corporate
Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40. GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1025, 1054 (2009).
28. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberaliz ation And Economic Development: The Role Of Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 507 (1998).
29. See id.
30. See id.
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impartial international forum providing facilities for the resolution of legal disputes be-
tween eligible parties.3 '
Until the beginning of 2008, over 2,600 such agreements exist.32 The majority of these
BITs remain between developed and developing countries. 33 As the main sources of inter-
national investment law, BITs provide investment security and investment neutrality to
foreign investment. 34 Most importantly, they include provisions that address the protec-
tion of foreign investors from unlawfil expropriation or nationalization, discriminatory,
unfair and inequitable treatment less favorable in comparison to that of the domestic in-
vestor, and protect against restriction of currency transfer. Most BITs contain similar
provisions and preambles, investment and investor definitions, treatment of investment,
expropriation, currency transfer, subrogation and dispute settlement provisions. 3
III. Can a State Raise International Human Rights Obligation in a 'BIT'
Dispute Settlement Process?
Discussing the evolution and general contents of BITs above, one understands that the
main concern of the investment treaty is to boom a FDI by offering maximum legal pro-
tection to the investment and the investors. The concern in the international investment
activities is not only limited to the private interest of the foreign investors but also the
human rights interest of the local citizens of the host state has to carry as equal legal
weight and as germane as that of the private investors. This, therefore calls for inclusion
of international human rights values into the exit process of international investment dis-
pute settlement. It must be noted that the investment protection could better respect and
will not have to be a direct detriment towards the international human rights commitment
of the host states. The thesis is that these two fields of international law are not hermeti-
cally separate disciplines that cannot interact in a meaningfil way.36 For all their contex-
tual and ideological dissimilarities, investment law and human rights are two fields of
international law pursuing the same powerfil project of a global rule of law. 37
International investment treaties today follow a fairly standard design, which mainly
focuses on providing foreign investors with special international law rights and remedies
to protect the investment. Through special dispute settlement processes of investor-state
arbitration, individual foreign investors can initiate international arbitrations directly
against the host state for alleged breaches of international investment agreements. 38
31. See article 1(2) of The convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of other States: "The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitra-
tion of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention."
32. HOWARD MANN, INTERNATIONAL INVESTmENT AGREEMENTS, BUSINESS AND HUMTIAN RIGHTS:
KEY ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2008).
33. See id.
34. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 265 (1994).
35. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 217 (2d ed. 2004).
36. Surya P. Subedi, The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles within the Law of Foreign Investment
with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpretation of the Term "Expropriation", 40 INT'L LAW. 121,
123 (2006).
37. See id. at 140.
38. See id. at 133.
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There is a substantial fear among human rights lawyers that "arbitrators set up to resolve
disputes tnder these bilateral investment treaties are trusted to protect the interest of
investors over the interest of the public."39 In a recent investment arbitration case, Toto v.
Lebanon, the panel reduced the definition of "investment" into simply profit motivated
economic activities. 40 Following these new developments, it would be worrisome to imag-
ine the practical tension between the protection of private interests of the investors and
public interest of the citizen of the host-state, the consequence of which might soon
evolve into a structural bicker between investment-sending and investment-receiving
countries.
The investor-state battle is discernible particularly when the host state attempts to in-
voke its international human rights obligation on behalf of the interest of its public with
reference to the protection of environmental rights, indigenous peoples' right, public
health, etc. What degree of attention should be given to the human rights obligation of
the host-state in the settlement process of investor-state dispute, whose cause of action
resulted from the regulatory activities of the state in response to the requirement of a
separate international commitment, i.e., human rights commitment the state owes?
Indubitably, a great number of international human rights lawyers argue that states
could legitimately raise human rights obligations in their pleadings before investment ar-
bitral tribunals.41 Following this thesis, there are two findamental parameters worth dis-
cussing. From the outset, BIT is not a self-governing regime of international law where
investment arbitrators must cling only to the rules mentioned in the bilateral instrument
by ignoring the customary international human rights norms.42 International Law is best
understood as a comprehensively interconnected system of different laws governing dif-
ferent subjects. 4 3 This may validate the host-state's assumption of international human
rights commitment whenever there is either theoretical or practical conflict in the process
of investment dispute settlement.
Second, the traditional practice of "police power" would be presumed to allow the host-
state to effectuate all necessary regulatory activities towards the investment, of which dis-
charging the international human rights obligation is of the essence. The following
paragraphs explore these two grounds just mentioned above and in so doing it interweaves
and traverses the relevant cases of international investment dispute into the discussion for
closer demonstration of the matter.
A. Is BIT A "SELF-CoNTAiNED REGIME" OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The camp of thought that seeks to exclude international human rights norms from the
investment dispute settlement process is based on nothing but the postulate that BIT is an
39. Sigrief Wiessner, The New Haven School of urisprudence: A Universal Toolkit for Understanding and Shap-
ing the Law, 18 AsIA PACIFIC LAW REvIEw 45, 57-58 (2010).
40. Toto Construzioni Generali Spa v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on
Jurisdiction (2009).
41. James Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law's
Unity, 18 DurcJCIL 77, 129 (2007).
42. See Wiessner, supra note 39, at 58.
43. See id.
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independent and self-governing regime that stays out of any other international law.
44
Resolving whether the highly specialized field of international investment law, owing to
its particular functional focus, constitutes a self-contained and independent international
legal regime had produced scholarly battles; "unfortunately, there is little, if any, agree-
ment among arbitral tribunals on how to deal with the competing non-investment
obligations. ' 4
The notion of a self-contained regime was first used in the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice's S.S. Wimbledon case46 and was firther developed by the International
Court of Justice in the Tehran Hostages decision. 47 In introducing the concept, the Inter-
national law Commission (ILC) has referred to the concept as a "group of rules and prin-
ciples concerned with a particular subject matter that may form a special regime ("Self-
Contained regime") and be applicable as lex specialis. Such special regimes often have their
own institutions to administer the relevant rules. ' 4 Based on this notion, some commen-
tators of international investment law have attempted to understand BIT as an autono-
mous part of international law that is a self-contained regime;49 and while others like
Professor S. Wiessner express worries about the negative impact of introducing BITs as "a
self-contained regime" because, he maintains, "the concept can't help in accommodating
different public interests (human rights, environment, public health, cultural concerns, etc.) in
the realm of trade and investment."50
Pursuant to this, it is strongly agreed with the expression of Professor Wiessner, and to
firther "dismisse this radical notion of [BIT as] self-contained regimes since it is incon-
ceivable for [a general international law] system to be made up of entirely autonomous
subsystems." The interconnectedness of different rules of international law only requires
that international investment treaties cannot be ftinctional and operational without bring-
44. See OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAW, Unification Rather Than Fragmentation of International
Law? The Case of International Invetmen Lawy and Human Rights Law, in HUIAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 15 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmanm, and Franchesco
Francioni eds., 2009).
45. MARC JACOB, INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREE
MENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 30 (2010).
46. On the morning of March 2st, 1921, the British steamship "Wimbledon", chartered bythe French arma-
ment firm "Les Affreteurs reunis", proceeding to Danzig with a cargo of 4,000 tons of goods (military mate-
rial), was refused access to, and free passage through the Kiel Canal by the German authorities. In reply to
the protests made to the German Government on this subject on March 23rd, 1921, by the French Ambassa-
dor at Berlin, that Government reaffirmed its refusal to allow the passage of this vessel and, in justification of
this refusal, alleged that the cargo of the steamship "Wimbledon" consisted of war material destined for
Poland, that the Treaty of Peace between the latter country and Russia was not yet ratified, that there was
therefore a state of war between those countries, and that German regulations regarding neutrality forbade
the transit across German territory of war material destined for these two countries. S.S. "Wimbledon" Case,
1923 PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 1 (Aug. 17).
47. See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L., 483, 491 (2006); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 38-40 (May 24); see also International Law Commission, 58th session, Report of the Study
Group of the International law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 8 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 T 11 (April 13, 2006)
[hereinafter "The ILC Consolidated Report, 2006"].
48. The ILC Consolidated Report, 2006, T 11.
49. See James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on Responsihility of States for 1nternation
ally WrongfuIActs: A Retrospect, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 874, 880 (2002).
50. See Wiessner, supra note 39, at 58;
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ing international human rights law into the equation.5 ' Claiming that BIT can really form
a self-contained and autonomous regime of international law may not only turn out to
result in the fragmentation of public international legal rules, but it can also become un-
realistic to distinctively consider BIT to filly resolve the social problem that arises in the
course of economic and investment interaction between foreign investors and host-states.
B. Is THE REGULATORY POWER/PoLICE POWER OF THE HosT-STATES
LEGITIMATE?
Investors have always challenged the host-State's regulatory actions by alleging that
they violate BIT protections against expropriation on the ground that BITs generally pro-
hibit government expropriation of an investor's investment unless it is for a non-discrimi-
natory public purpose and the investor is compensated. 2 The difficulty, however, lies in
how one can find valid lines of intersection between the investment protection and the
host state's regulatory power because not all governmental deprivations of property con-
stitute an expropriation.5 3 In what kinds of areas can the host-state's regulatory powers be
legitimately practiced? Regulatory issues that can be placed in the realm of international
human rights can help the host-state to legitimately invoke its international human rights
commitment as aJbrce majeure in the investor-state dispute settlement process.5 4 In order
to comprehend how this can be effective, let us just dissect how important of a practice the
notion of 'police power' reveals.
The idea of regulatory power of states has a deep conceptual interface with the theory
of "police power," the theory which has its roots in centuries old customary international
law. Black's Law Dictionary defines the theory in the following terms:
Police power is a theory that describes the basic right of governments to make laws
and regulations for the benefit of their communities. It is "[tlhe power of a state to
replace restraints on personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protec-
tion of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public conve-
nience and general prosperity .... Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right
of a government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general wel-
fare within the constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government."55 It
is the authority conferred upon the states or countries to enact measures to preserve
and protect the safety, health, welfare, and morals of the community. It is the ftimda-
mental right of a government to make all necessary laws.5 6
International law authorities have regularly recognized the positive practice of "police
power" regulation that might justify non-compensation where there is a deprivation in
51. See id.




55. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). This definition draws on US law in the area, but is
consistent with international law; see also George Aldrich, What Constitutes A Compensahle Taking of Property?
The Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunals, 88 AJIL 585, 605 (1994).
56. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY, at 1156.
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favor of public order and morality, protection of human health and environment, and state
taxation. s7 There are different views regarding the theory of police power in the discourse
of international investment dispute: that, whether the "police powers" are a criterion which
is weighed in the balance with other factors or it is a controlling element that exempts
automatically the measure from any duty for compensation. 8 Exercise of police powers
allows the state to protect essential public interests from certain types of harms.5 9 Let us
take a hypothetical demonstration of this predicament. For example, a state might ban the
use of an insecticide that scientific studies have demonstrated as cancer-causing, even
where applied in minute amounts. 60 Supposing this pesticide was an investor's only in-
vestment, the ban could result in the complete destruction of the investment and no com-
pensation would be due.61 This requires the State to undertake a legislative measure to
protect and ensure the right to adequate health of its own citizens.
In the milieu of the state's duty to protect, promote, and filfill human rights (states'
parameter of international human rights obligation), the most significant issue that comes
into the equation gets bolder, in most cases, as a result of the ensuing duty of the state to
take a legislative measures and enforcement actions as part of integrating international
human rights obligations into domestic laws and policy. This directly communicates to
what has been pronounced above as the "police power" of host states to regulate or ensure
that the health of the public is in order. However, the predicament both theoretically and
practically elucidates itself in the ambiances where bilateral investment agreements are
purposefully designed to limit the right of states to regulate. This limit may as well be
diffused to systematically minimize the states duty to protect and promote human rights.
In the eye of general international law and practice, one has to stand for the proposition
that investment rules cannot operate in an isolated fashion far from the human rights
spirit of the general public in the host state. This is why the host-state should be allowed
to echo its international human rights obligation in the investment dispute settlement
process. To help draw a clear picture of the issue, for example, one may assume another
scenario where a state is forced to regulate the activities of a foreign investment as an
attempt to halt the investor from engaging in actions or omissions that exacerbate or
aggravate the severe shortage of drinking water the state already has (particularly owing to
the fact that drinking water is a limited natural resource and that it is a fundamental condi-
tions for survival). As a matter of fact, the 1966 International Convention for Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)-one of the influential international human rights
instruments-stipulates that the state parties have immediate obligations in relation to the
right to water to take steps towards the full realization of adequate living standards under
articles 11 (1), and 12.62 In view of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
57. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 52, at 358.
58. See id. at 361.
59. See generally Bruno Simma &Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and Human Rights. First
Steps Towards a Methodology, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 2lST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HON
OUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (2009).
60. See generally Subedi, supra n. 36.
61. See generally Mnthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Clash of Glohali ations and the International Law of
Foreign Investment: The Simon Reismen Lecture in International Trade Policy, 10 CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
JOURNAL (2003).
62. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16,
1966). Article 2(1): "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
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Rights General Comment No. 15 (2002), such steps must be deliberate, concrete and
targeted towards the fill realization of the right to water. 63 States parties have a constant
and continuing duty under the Covenant to move as expeditiously and effectively as possi-
ble towards the fill realization of the right to water.64
Given the above scenario, one can argue that the regulatory effort of the host state, also
considered as a legitimate action, is also a positive obligation imposed on states to realize
socio-economic rights of citizens. Nonetheless, the degree to which a host-state engages
in regulatory activity of foreign investment should be commensurable and proportional to
the threat of abuse posed by the investor to the local resources.
C. SURVEY OF PRACTICAL CHALLENGES: THE ICSID
The International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) is an autono-
mous international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID or the
Washington Convention) with over 140 (one hundred and forty) member States with the
primary purpose to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international in-
vestment disputes. 6 Jurisdiction of the Center, according to article 25 ARTICLE 25 (1) of
its establishment Convention, "extends to any legal dispute arising directly out of an in-
vestment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Con-
tracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Cen-
tre." It is considered to be the leading international arbitration institution devoted to
resolving disputes between States and foreign investors, also known as BIT arbitrations.
The ICSID is an impartial international forum providing facilities for arbitration of inter-
national investment disputes. 66 The ICSID does not itself arbitrate disputes, but provides
the rules and procedures for independent arbitration tribunals to resolve disputes. 6r The
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." Arti-
cle 11(1): "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate stan-
dard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based
on free consent."
63. Id.
64. General Comment no. 15: The Right to Water, Comm. On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
29th Sess., Nov. 11-29, 2002, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
65. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, www.internationalarbi
trationlaw.com/arbitral-institutions/icsid/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). "Generally, ICSID proceedings are held
at the Centre's headquarters in Washington, D.C. However, parties may agree to hold their proceeding in
another location where ICSID has a pre-established arrangement. These locations include: Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague; Regional Arbitration Centers of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Commit-
tee at Cairo, at Kuala Lumpur and at Lagos; Australian Commercial Disputes Centre at Sydney; Australian
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration at Melbourne; Singapore International Arbitration Centre;
Gulf Cooperation Council Commercial Arbitration Centre at Bahrain; German Institution of Arbitration;
and Maxwell Chambers, Singapore."
66. See id.
67. See id.
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use of ICSID arbitration has increased rapidly over the past twenty years, as the number
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has risen.
The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.68 The BITs that are con-
cluded between states (there are approximately over 2,600 BITs in effect according to the
data of ICSID) are the major source of substantive law in settling the disputes, while the
ICSID Convention is used as a source of procedural laws in the process of the dispute
settlement. 6
9
BITs create an international legal right of standing for individuals to bring claims
against the host country. ICSID arbitration is the preferred method for investor-state
dispute resolution. According to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) data, almost two-thirds of the 219 known investment treaty claims were filed
against developing countries.70 Thirty-seven (37) developing countries are defendants in
investor-state arbitration claims, with several countries facing multiple claims. 71 Against
this backdrop, there is growing criticism of ICSID by the developing world and the per-
ception that ICSID tends to decides disputes in favor of the foreign investor.72
At the heart of this criticism is whether the interests of the private investor override the
regulatory power of the State. The foreign investor will always try to protect their foreign
investment and the State often acts in a regulatory manner to protect the public interest.
Not surprisingly, these interests usually collide when the government's regulatory action
is in areas of public services, such as the provision of water, electricity, waste disposal and
sanitation services and other social and environmental impacts more generally. The
human rights issues arising out of this small but powerful world of private investment
arbitration and the ICSID system as a whole present complex questions around the suc-
cess of the system to meet its purported goal to spur sustainable and fair economic growth
in developing countries.73 With over 300 arbitrations known to have been initiated, the
range of matters covers all types of regulatory measure, including environmental, human
health, taxation, urban planning, and many more. 74
Given the uncertainties, one may rightly ask whether international human rights law
can be brought into the decision-making mix in the investor-state arbitrations in order to
tilt the balance in favor of a state's right to regulate. Investor-state arbitrations always
begin from the allegation by the investor that its rights under the BIT have been
breached. The final decision will be on whether a state has violated the rights of an inves-
tor. So, for this purpose, if the underlying issues in the dispute also raise international
human rights law questions, they can be raised in the course of the legal arguments, even
though the existing jurisprudence witnesses that little or no attention is given to human
68. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AboutICSID Home.jsp (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
69. See id.
70. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Latest Development in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment, IIA Monitor No. 4, at 9-10, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IT/2005/2 (2005), at 2-3.
71. See id. at 3.
72. See id. at 7-8.
73. See id.
74. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Trea-
ties: A Review, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4 (2006); Luke Eric Peterson, Investment Treaty
News 2006: Year in Review (2006), at 3-6, available at www. iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn-year-review_2006.pdf.
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rights to affect the outcome of the judgment more than the interest of the investors
does.75
There is the lack of clear and consistent rules that authorize or help these tribunals
consider the arguments of necessity submitted by host-countries, as part of complying
with their separate obligations under the international human rights regime. 76 The arbi-
trators that resolve BIT disputes can also present a problem for the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights.77 Generally, in investor-state arbitration tribunals, as provided in
the Washington Convention, the parties choose the arbitrators. Each party has the right
to appoint one arbitrator and the third arbitrator is chosen through agreement of the two
party-nominated arbitrators.78 However, arbitrators present two distinct problems. First,
human rights norms may be outside the scope of the arbitrator's expertise.79 There are no
significant restrictions on who can serve as arbitrators and ICSID requires that arbitrators
must have "recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance." 80
Most BIT arbitrators have commercial backgrounds and are not familiar with matters
pertaining to human rights-related laws.81 Even if a tribunal found it appropriate to ad-
dress a human rights-related matter, the arbitrators may not be filly versed in how to
proceed. 82 Conversely, many human rights experts would similarly lack the necessary ex-
pertise in international investment law to serve as an arbitrator in BIT arbitration. 83
The realm of international investment arbitrators is a relatively small, close community,
and understandably, these specialized arbitrators are concerned with "the securing of their
next appointment to a tribunal"-consequently, it is safe to assume that their actions must
ensure that corporations and investors will want them to serve as arbitrators in the ft-
ture.8 4 In this small community, to obtain fiture employment, arbitrators must make a
"display of commercial probity and their loyalty to the values of multinational business."8 5
This will have a substantial drawback on the advocacy of international human rights stan-
dards into the sphere of bilateral investment dispute settlement process.
75. See generally Peter Muchlinski, Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under the Fair
and Equitahle Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 527 (2006).
76. LUKE EPic PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL INVEST
MENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 5 (2003) available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2003/investment inrhuman rights bits.pd f.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id.
79. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A de Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 304, at 352-54 (2009).
80. Tony Cole,Arbitrator Appointments in Investment Arbitration: Why Expressed Views on Points of Law Should
be Challengeable, 1 INVESTmENT TREATY NEWS Q. 13, 14 (2010), availahle at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/
09/23arbitrator-appointments-in-investment-arbitration-why-expressed-views-on-points-of-law-shoud-be-
challengeable-2/.
81. Marc Jacob, International Ivestment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
HUMAN RIGHTS, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2010), at 25.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 483 (2011).
85. See id.
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IV. Conclusion and Alternatives for Policy Consideration
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), as the major source of international investment law,
exhibits a controversy: whether or not it is an autonomous and self-governing/self-con-
tained regime of international law with the exclusion of other rules of international law,
e.g., rules of international human rights. The design of these treaties, in their present
form, is asymmetrical precisely because foreign investors are being accorded substantive
rights under these treaties without being subject to any specific obligations. BITs grant
investors valuable rights but do not provide any reciprocal obligations. Besides the asym-
metrical nature of the treaties in defining substantive rights, the procedural matters
through which the investment dispute is settled, as the situation stands now, gives a little
or no room for consideration of international human rights in the process. Whether there
is a need for a greater degree of balance in BITs between the legitimate interests of inves-
tors and host countries' regulatory power has always displayed the significance of intro-
ducing and embracing human rights norms in the settlement of the investment disputes.
Remodeling of the current nature of BITs to encompass clear provisions of human
rights, and most importantly referencing specific international human rights treaties in a
BIT, is a possible step to be considered when seeking to improve the protection of human
rights in the sphere of bilateral investment. The investor-state dispute resolution clause of
the treaty must also contain a provision indicating specifically how human rights obliga-
tions can actually be enforced before an arbitral tribunal. Language that recognizes and
supports the host-state's duty to protect and promote human rights, as well as language
that supports and clarifies the responsibility of foreign investors to respect human rights
must be clearly spelled out during the negotiations of future BITs.
Capital- exporting states need to respond to the grievances of violations of internation-
ally accepted rights by moving towards adopting a new generation of BITs that imposes
human rights obligations upon corporations. As part of that, it has to be required that
investors comply with a "due diligence" standard and be subject to the doctrine of "clean
hand" as an opportnmity to generate a legal responsibility of the investor towards human
rights. States should reform BITs to remove, or at least limit, hindrances on a host-State's
regulatory power to protect human rights, and they should re-engineer the normative
framework of BITs to reflect a broader and sustainable development policy with substan-
tive language that acknowledges broader jurisdiction regarding human rights-related mat-
ters in arbitral processes. International human rights norms and rules have arguably
achieved the status of jus cogens, much more than the rules and norms of international
investment, and therefore, can conclusively generate an obligation erga omnes towards any
actor of international law.
From the perspective of the practice of the arbitral tribunals, it is recommended that the
balancing role that it plays to compromise the private interests and public interest can be
more grounded in the general international law rules given that there is a willingness to
accept the cross-fertilization of precedents and practices of international human rights
forums in interpreting different rights. Understanding the goal of international invest-
ment as narrowly as pushing the human rights norms out of the commercial realm would
only make humanity and human dignity a collateral damage, not to mention the conse-
quence of uncertainty and unsustainability of international development itself!
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